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The ‘Black Spot’ on the Crimea: Venereal Diseases in the Black Sea fleet in the 
1920s. 
The situation is quite scandalous, unacceptable and 
unprecedented in any of the other fleets at this present time. 
The Black Sea fleet has broken the world record, and moved 
into first place. I think that it is a disgrace not only for the 
Black Sea fleet, but also for the navy as a whole.1  
Romuald Muklevich, the Commander of the Soviet Naval 
Forces. 
In the mid-1920s, much to the horror of the Red Navy’s high command, the Black Sea fleet 
was reportedly the most venereally diseased fleet in the world. This article will use the 
case study of the Black Sea fleet in the city of Sevastopol between 1922 and 1928 to 
explore Soviet command’s perception of venereal diseases as a threat to the security of 
the Soviet state during the unstable first peacetime decade of its existence.2 It will also 
interrogate the ways in which high command directed the local campaign against 
venereal diseases. Their discussions reveal how the discourse surrounding these diseases 
was often linked with wider questions of morality, sexuality and social control. The article 
will place its analysis in the context of a broader literature, which explores the ways in 
which venereal diseases are constructed by those in authority and are subject to 
reinterpretation depending on the specific social, political, cultural and economic 
conditions of a particular society.3 The Soviet Union provides a vivid illustration of this 
reinterpretation, as the state financed and controlled all research on venereal diseases 
and their relationship with society. Both the Soviet classification and treatment of disease 
                                                          
1 Letter from Muklevich to the Revolutionary Soviet for Naval Forces in the Black Sea, 14 December 1927, 
Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Voenno-Morskogo Flota (subsequently RGAVMF) f. 1483, op. 1, d. 56, 
Materialy ob organizatsii bor’by s venericheskimi zabolevaniiami v chernovskom flote, l. 13.  
2 Until 1935, this fleet was called the Naval Forces of the Black Sea and Sea of Azov. Throughout this article, 
I will use the Black Sea fleet despite this official nomenclature. I will also use the plural venereal diseases 
as I am addressing perceptions of both syphilis and gonorrhoea.  
3 Social historians have discussed this in a variety of historical periods and geographical settings. For 
example: C. S. Wood, ‘Syphilis in Anthropological Perspective’, Social Science and Medicine, 12 (1978), 47-
55; L. Engelstein, ‘Syphilis, Historical and Actual: Cultural Geography of a Disease’, Clinical Infectious 
Diseases, 8, 6 (1986), 1036-1048; A. M. Brandt, No Magic Bullet: A Social History of Venereal Diseases in the 
United States Since 1880 (Oxford, 1987); S. A. Colwell, ‘The End of the Road: Gender, The Dissemination of 
Knowledge and the American Campaign against Venereal Disease during World War One’ in P. Treichler, L. 
Cartwright, C. Penley (eds), The Visible Woman: Imaging Technologies, Gender and Science (New York, 
1998). 
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reveals the extent to which those in authority believed the state could legitimately 
interfere in the private lives of individual citizens.  
A number of studies have investigated disease in the military and navy, but the 
majority have been focused on wartime.4 Studying the construction of disease during 
peacetime illuminates the ways in which states continued to justify the surveillance of 
their populations in the absence of the impending threat of the invading enemy.5 Wartime 
studies have also emphasised how states used the urgency of combat to justify greater 
interference into the private lives of its populace. Scholarship on the early Soviet Union 
has explored how the Soviet state intervened in the everyday lives of its citizens through 
campaigns of so-called ‘struggle’ against social problems, such as petty crime and 
illiteracy.6 Sexuality in the Russian and Soviet military has also become a topic of 
historical interest for scholars in recent years.7 This article will build on this literature, 
                                                          
4 To name but a few: L. A. Hall, ‘Venereal Diseases and Society in Britain, From the Contagious Diseases Acts 
to the National Health Service’ in R. Davidson and L. A. Hall (eds), Sin, Sex and Suffering: Venereal Disease 
and European Society Since 1870 (Abingdon, 2001); L. Bland and F. Mort, ‘Look Out for the Good Time Girl: 
Dangerous Sexualities as a Threat to National Health’ in B. Schwarz (ed). Formations of Nations and People 
(London, 1984); M. Harrison, ‘The British Army and the Problem of Venereal Disease in France and Egypt 
During the First World War’, Medical History, 39, 2 (April 1995), 133-158; B. Taithe, Defeated Flesh: 
Medicine, Welfare and Warfare in the Making of Modern France (Lanham, 1999); A. F. Timm, ‘Sex With a 
Purpose: Prostitution, Venereal Disease and Militarized Masculinity in the Third Reich’ in D. Herzog (ed). 
Sexuality and German Fascism (New York, 2005); V. Harris, ‘The Role of the Concentration Camps in the 
Nazi Repression of Prostitutes, 1933-9’, Journal of Contemporary History, 45, 3 (July 2010), 675-698; N. 
Wingfield, ‘The Enemy Within: Regulating Prostitution and Controlling Venereal Disease in Cisleithanian 
Austria during the Great War’, Central European History 46, 3 (September 2013), 468-98; P. Kramer, 
‘Colonial Crossings: Prostitution, Disease and the Boundaries of Empire During the Philippine-American 
War’ in E. Rosenberg and S. Fitzpatrick (eds), Body and Nation: The Global Realm of US Body Politics in the 
Twentieth Century (Durham, 2014); A. Kampf, Mapping Out the Venereal Wilderness: Public Health and STD 
in New Zealand 1920-1980 (Berlin, 2007). 
5 Philippa Levine has produced an excellent study which deals with the treatment and classification of 
venereal diseases in the military of the British Empire. See, P. Levine, Prostitution, Race and Politics: Policing 
Venereal Disease in the British Empire (New York and London, 2003). On the French military during 
peacetime see J. Surkis, Sexing the Citizen: Morality and Masculinity in France, 1870-1920 (Ithaca and 
London, 2006). Recent studies have also explored venereal disease control in civilian populations during 
peacetime, for example L. D. H. Sauerteig, ‘The Fatherland is in Danger, Save the Fatherland!: Venereal 
Disease, Sexuality and Gender in Imperial and Weimar Germany’; M. W. Tuck, ‘Venereal Disease, Sexuality 
and Society in Uganda’; A. Lundberg, ‘Passing the “Black Judgement”: Swedish Social Policy on Venereal 
Disease in the Early Twentieth Century’, all in Sin, Sex and Suffering, op.cit. 
6 Some examples from a vast body of literature include: D. L. Hoffman, Stalinist Values: The Cultural Norms 
of Soviet Modernity, 1917-1941 (Ithaca, 2003); C. Clark, Uprooting Otherness: The Literacy Campaign in NEP-
era Russia (London and Cranbury, 2000); L. Shelley, ‘The Geography of Soviet Criminality’, American 
Sociological Review, 45, 1 (1980), 111-122; W. Z. Goldman, Women, the State and Revolution: Soviet Family 
Policy and Social Life, 1917-1936 (Cambridge, 1993). 
7 A. B. Astashov, ‘Seksual’nyi Opyt Russkogo Soldata na Pervoi Mirovoi i Ego Posledstviia dlia Voiny i Mira’, 
Voenno-Istoricheskaia Antropologiia: Ezhegodnik (2005-6), 367-382; O. Budnitskii, ‘Muzhchiny i 
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by arguing that the Soviet state used the urgency of the Black Sea fleet’s apparent rife 
venereal diseases to legitimise interference into both the private and intimate spheres. 
The struggle with venereal diseases allowed the state to classify, regulate and probe the 
bodies of its servicemen, as well as to control sailors’ private activities during shore leave.  
As no explicit mentions of queer sexual contact were observed in archival material 
at the Russian State Archive of the Navy (RGAVMF), this article deals specifically with 
heterosexual commercial sex between male servicemen and female prostitutes. However, 
this is not to say that same-sex relations did not happen within the Soviet Navy.8 Instead, 
the absence of same-sex relations in discussions of sailors’ sexuality is indicative of the 
naval authorities’ rigid understanding of venereal disease transmission and stigma 
surrounding homosexuality. This article will begin with an overview of the struggle 
against venereal diseases in the early Soviet Union, and then move on to explore how the 
naval high command waged this campaign in the Black Sea during a period of supposed 
mass infection.   
The struggle with venereal diseases in Russia and the Soviet Union 
Late imperial and early Soviet authorities conceptualised the issue of venereal diseases 
in the military in the same way. Both the Imperial and Soviet Navies caused military high 
command the greatest anxiety, as levels of venereal diseases were consistently higher for 
sailors than soldiers. A medically compromised military force threatened national 
security. Therefore, the Imperial and Soviet states used the objective of a healthy and 
efficient navy to justify frequent intervention into the private lives, and even bodies, of 
servicemen. This section will begin with a discussion of the Russian Imperial Navy. 
The struggle with venereal diseases in the military had been an important feature 
of late imperial policy making. In the early 1900s, high command frequently debated the 
best methods with which to combat disease, and recommended to sailors a wide array of 
                                                          
Zhenshchiny v Krasnoi Armii, 1941-1945’, Cahiers du Monde Russe 52, 2-3 (2011), 405-22; E. S. Seniavskaia, 
‘Bez Baby i Bez Vina i Voina ne Nuzhna: Problemy Frontovoi Morali v Period Pervoi Mirovoi Voiny’, 
Istoricheskaia Psikhologiia i Sotsologiia Istorii, 1 (2013), 32-38; D. Healey, ‘Love and Death: Transforming 
Sexualities in Russia, 1914-1922’ in M. Frame, B. Kolonitskii, S. G. Marks and M. K. Stockdale (eds), Russian 
Culture in War and Revolution, 1914-22, Book 2. Political Culture, Identities, Mentalities and Memory 
(Bloomington, 2014), 153-162. 
8 Dan Healey provides plenty of examples of sailors engaging in same-sex prostitution in late imperial 
Russia and the early Soviet Union. See D. Healey, Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia: the Regulation 
of Sexual and Gender Dissent (Chicago and London, 2001). 
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prophylactic methods ranging from condoms and special ointments to total abstinence.9 
Discussions of venereal diseases in the naval forces focused on the threats that they posed 
to national security. Infection depleted the Russian empire’s valuable resource of 
manpower by causing inefficiency and removing men from active service.10 
Medical personnel were far more concerned with the sexual behaviour of sailors 
rather than of soldiers. Sailors had higher wages and more free time during the autumn 
and winter months to visit prostitutes.11 There were also significantly higher numbers of 
registered prostitutes in port cities, which suggests that women migrated to these 
locations to work in the sex industry. For example, in 1910 the port cities of Sevastopol 
and Simferopol were home to seventy per cent of the entire prostitute population of 
Taurida province.12 One 1901 report by Dr Grivtsova of Sevastopol revealed that levels 
of venereal diseases within the lower ranks were four times higher in the naval forces 
than those who worked on land.13 Therefore, the imperial authorities perceived the need 
to control venereal diseases as particularly urgent in the context of the Navy.  
The tsarist authorities and high command of the Imperial Navy both believed that 
the most effective way to prevent venereal diseases was to target the source, which in 
most cases was presumed to be the prostitute.14 Therefore, the authorities introduced a 
system of regulated prostitution, which remained in place from 1843 until the fall of the 
autocracy in 1917.  Regulation, or nadzor, was introduced with the official aim of 
controlling levels of venereal disease. In order to work legally, prostitutes were required 
                                                          
9 Some of these methods are detailed in a letter from the medical inspector of the Port of Emperor Alexander 
III in Libava to the commander of the port, 6 September 1909. RGAVMF, f. 928, op. 1, d. 587, Imperatora 
Aleksandra III Upravleniia Porta: s perepiska o Libavskom vrachebnoe politseiskoi komitet dliia nadzora za 
prostiutsiei v Libave, l. 18 
10 For example, the way in which venereal diseases remove men from service is discussed by the 
Commander of the Port of Emperor Alexander III in a letter to the governor of Kurliand province. RGAVMF, 
f. 928, op. 1, d. 587, l. 23. 
11 RGAVMF, f. 928, op. 1, d. 940, O razrabotke komissiei mer dliia bolezniami v porte Imperatora Aleksandra 
III, l. 7. 
12 This is also true of the port of Libava in Kurliand province (fifty-one per cent); Riga in Lifliand province 
(sixty-five per cent); and the port cities of Odessa and Nikolaev in Kherson province (eighty-seven per cent). 
See Glavnoe Upravlenie po Delam Mestnogo Khoziaistva, Vrachebnoi-Politseiskii Nadzor za Gorodskoi 
Prostitutsiei (Saint Petersburg, 1910), 10; 12; 22; 26. 
13 RGAVMF, f. 408, op. 1, d. 940, l. 6. 
14 The medical authorities in the Port of Emperor Alexander III collected statistics on who sailors named as 
the source of their infection in 1909 and 1911. All but two sailors named prostitutes as the source. RGAVMF, 
f. 928, op. 1, d. 588, S svedeniiami o nizhnikh chinakh zabolevshikh venericheskimi bolezniami, ll. 1-27; 
RGAVMF f. 928, op. 1, d. 648, S svedeniiami o nizhnikh chinakh zabolevshikh venericheskimi bolezniami, l. 4, 
l. 73.  
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to register their details with their local medical-police committee, a section of law 
enforcement in charge of ensuring that regulation ran smoothly at a regional level. 
Systems of regulated prostitution also existed in France, Germany, Italy, Great Britain, 
and Spain in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.15 Through weekly or 
biweekly compulsory medical examinations, the authorities monitored the sexual health 
of the prostitute, and incarcerated her in hospital if she was infected.16  
This system entirely failed to limit the spread of venereal diseases. Although 
prostitutes were legally obliged to be examined regularly, limited venereological 
knowledge and a lack of symptoms at the latent stages of venereal infection meant that 
physicians were often unable to accurately detect these diseases.17 The examination of 
male clients was not legally mandated, which also contributed to the extensive spread of 
disease. Through regulation, the authorities placed the full responsibility for the spread 
of venereal diseases on the prostitute. The imperial authorities used this connection to 
justify their extensive power over the bodies of these women. Registered prostitutes 
were required to submit their internal passports, a document essential for movement and 
employment, to the police in exchange for an alternative identity card, which displayed 
information about their sexual health.  The Provisional Government abolished this 
system of regulation in 1917. Following their seizure of power in October, the Bolsheviks 
used alternative measures to control venereal diseases. 
After the October revolution, discussions of methods for combatting disease 
continued, but now they took on a new significance. In the new state discourse, venereal 
diseases were presented as a remnant of the decadence and corruption of bourgeois 
capitalist society, and something completely incompatible with the socialist state. Like 
their pre-revolutionary counterparts, the Bolsheviks regarded prostitution as the most 
                                                          
15 For the regulation of prostitution in France, see A. Corbin, A. Corbin, Women for Hire: Prostitution and 
Sexuality in France after 1850, trans A. Sheridan (Cambridge and London, 1990). Germany: J. Roos, ‘Backlash 
Against Prostitutes’ Rights: Origins and Dynamics of Nazi Prostitution Policies’ in D. Herzog (ed). Sexuality 
and German Fascism (New York, 2005). Italy: M. Gibson, Prostitution and State in Italy, 1860-1915 
(Columbus, 1999). Great Britain: J. Walkowitz, Prostitution and Victorian Society: Women, Class and the State 
(Cambridge, 1980).  Spain: chapter three in A. G. Moroillo, The Seduction of Modern Spain: The Female Body 
and the Francoist Body Politic (Lewisburg, 2010). 
16 For a comprehensive discussion of the tsarist regulation of prostitution see L. Bernstein, Sonia’s 
Daughters: Prostitutes and Their Regulation in Imperial Russia (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1995). 
17 L. Bernstein, ‘Yellow Tickets and State Licensed Brothels’: The Tsarist Government and the Regulation of 
Urban Prostitution’ in S. Gross Solomon and J. F. Hutchinson (eds), Health and Society in Revolutionary 
Russia (Bloomington, 1990), 48. 
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frequent method by which disease was spread. However, they focused on eradicating 
women’s economic motivations for entering prostitution, such as wage inequality, 
frequent dismissals and a lack of provisions for childcare, rather than sanctioning 
regulated prostitution.18 Alexandra Kollontai, Founder of the Women’s Department, 
argued in 1918 that the ‘disgusting, dark, debasing human evil’ of prostitution would 
disappear after the introduction of socialism, as the state would take steps to ensure that 
women received increased education, employment and maternal support.19 The 
Bolshevik authorities believed that the eradication of prostitution following socialism 
and the improvement of women’s economic lot would spell an automatic end to the 
abundant spread of venereal diseases. 
In the Soviet Union, venereal diseases were diagnosed and treated as part of the 
field of ‘social hygiene’. This included various diseases that Soviet medicine defined as 
contracted and spread as a result of societal factors, such as alcoholism, prostitution and 
narcotic addiction.20 This stemmed from the belief that these diseases were both 
biological and social phenomena, best understood within their social context.21 Venereal 
diseases threatened society on three levels: they jeopardised individual health, economic 
production through absence, and consequently the construction of the socialist state. 
Poor sexual health was therefore a public, rather than private illness. As Frances 
Bernstein has argued, societal concerns often eclipsed the interests of the individual in 
both pre-revolutionary and Soviet Russia, particularly with regards to patient privacy in 
the case of venereal diseases.22 The prioritisation of state interests over the privacy of 
individuals enabled the Soviet state to rationalise interventions on the bodies of its 
                                                          
18 Recommendations for combatting prostitution focused on the improvement of women’s economic lot, 
including raising the minimum wage and establishing dormitories for unemployed women. Memorandum 
of People’s Commissariat of Education on combating juvenile crime and prostitution, 1919, 
Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF subsequently), f. 413, op. 2, d. 327, Rasporiazheniia i 
tsirkuliary narodnogo komissariata sotsial’nogo obespecheniia. ll. 4-6.  
19 A. Kollontai, ‘Make Way for the Winged Eros’ translated and reproduced in W. G. Rosenberg (ed). 
Bolshevik Visions: First Phase of the Cultural Revolution in Soviet Russia, Part One: The Culture of a New 
Society, 2nd edn (Ann Arbor, 1990), 75. 
20 This was in contrast to countries such as the United States, for whom ‘social hygiene’ was restricted to 
the treatment of venereal diseases only, S. Gross Solomon and J. F Hutchinson, ‘Introduction: The Problem 
of Health Reform in Russia’ in Gross Solomon and Hutchinson, op.cit., xii. 
21 S. Gross Solomon, ‘Social Hygiene in Soviet Medical Education, 1922-30’, Journal of the History of Medicine 
and Allied Sciences, 45 (1990), 607-643, here 608. 
22 See F. Bernstein, ‘Behind the Closed Door: VD and Medical Secrecy in Early Soviet Medicine’ in F. 
Bernstein, C. Burton and D. Healey (eds), Soviet Medicine: Culture, Practice and Science (DeKalb, 2010), 96-
98. She argues that although medical secrecy was abolished with the aim of making venereal disease a 
‘misfortune’ rather than a ‘disgrace’, it often encouraged shamefulness and ostracism in practice. 
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citizens. Article 132 of the 1926 Family Code stipulated that couples who intended to 
marry were obliged to share information about their sexual health on the registration of 
their marriage, or face prosecution. In 1927, a government decree permitted the Ministry 
of Health to forcefully examine and treat a person suspected to have a venereal disease, 
if they refused voluntary treatment.23  
In the 1920s, treatments for syphilis and gonorrhoea in the Soviet Union, as across 
Europe and North America, were often long, repetitive and ineffective.24 Before the 
introduction of sulfanilamide as a cure for gonorrhoea in the late 1930s, Soviet physicians 
relied on silver-based treatment methods developed during the pre-revolutionary 
period.25 In the late nineteenth century, Protargol (silver proteinate) was introduced as 
a treatment for gonorrhoea. This method was employed after sexual intercourse, and 
involved urinating, washing the penis with soap and water and then injecting the diluted 
Protargol solution directly into the urethra.26 This treatment was often unreliable and 
only partly effective.27 The treatment of syphilis was more effective, especially after the 
introduction of Salvarsan, the ‘magic bullet’ syphilis cure developed at the laboratory of 
German physician Paul Ehrlich in the early 1900s. Syphilis treatment required a high 
degree of patient compliance. Treatment could last up to two years and patients were 
required to attend clinics regularly for repeated testing and injections, and often abstain 
from alcohol and sexual intercourse.28 Even in mid-1950s, a physician from the Institute 
of Advanced Medical Studies for Physicians in Leningrad reported that syphilis patients 
still had to attend weekly follow-up treatments for several years following their initial 
diagnosis.29 
 
                                                          
23 ibid., 104. 
24 On the situation in interwar Britain public treatment centres, see L. A. Hall, ‘Venereal Diseases and Society 
in Britain’, op.cit., 129-130. 
25 Sulfanilamide became the first medication to effectively treat gonorrhoea in 1938. Four grams per day of 
the treatment for at least three weeks produced an eighty per cent cure rate. T. G. Benedek, ‘Gonorrhoea 
and the Beginnings of Clinical Research Ethics’, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 48, 1 (2005), 54-73, 
here 70. 
26 Report by the medical inspector of the Port of Emperor Alexander III to the Port’s commander, 25 May 
1909. RGAVMF, f. 408, op. 1, d. 1581, O bor’by s venericheskimi zabolevaniia vo flotam, l. 43. For more 
information on this treatment in English see O. Wilson, ‘Venereal Diseases: Their Treatment and Cure’, The 
Canadian Medical 9, 2 (1919), 136-140. 
27 Bernstein, ‘Behind the Closed Door’, op.cit., 101. 
28 ibid., 101-102. 
29 P. V. Kozhewnikov, ‘Organisation of Syphilis Control in the Soviet Union’, British Journal of Venereal 
Diseases, 32 (1956), 229-230, here 229. 
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The Soviet government presented an image of unbridled success in the field of 
venerology. The Central Commission for the Struggle against Venereal Diseases met for 
the first time in October 1918 and contributed 61,500 roubles towards work in sanitary 
enlightenment, including lectures, leaflets, brochures, posters and exhibitions.30 In 1919, 
the People’s Commissariat of Education advocated compulsory sex education in schools, 
along with the mass publication of brochures and posters on the connections between 
venereal diseases and prostitution.31 The focus of this part of the campaign was on 
preventative education: the more the population were aware of the harmful effects of 
venereal diseases, the more likely they were to practice self-restraint and use 
prophylactics during sexual intercourse. The government also publicised their 
investment in research and treatment. The Special Bureau for Venereal Diseases and the 
Bronner Institute for Skin and Venereal Diseases opened between 1918 and 1919. The 
Bronner Institute had twelve institutes and thirty dispensaries under its jurisdiction, as 
well as a research laboratory, outpatient facilities and space to accommodate 440 
patients.32 Across the whole of the Soviet Union, the number of facilities for the treatment 
of venereal diseases rose from twelve in 1913 to eight hundred by 1928.33  
Statistics that evaluate the impact of increased treatment and research in the field 
of venerology are profoundly unreliable, given the Soviet state’s need to exaggerate levels 
of success in order to justify the campaign to struggle with venereal diseases. Therefore, 
how far this campaign actually reduced venereal diseases is questionable. Anglo-
American public health experts Sir Arthur Newsholme and John Adams Kingsbury, 
reported on the wider campaign of social hygiene in their 1933 publication Red Medicine: 
Socialised Health in Russia.34  The authors interviewed Dr. Kazaroff, the head of the 
Institute for Skin and Venereal Diseases in Moscow, who claimed that the number of 
registered syphilis cases in Moscow declined between 1927 and 1931, and attributed this 
                                                          
30 F. Bernstein, 'What Everyone Should Know About Sex': Gender, Sexual Enlightenment and the Politics of 
Health in Revolutionary Russia, 1918-1931’, (Ph.D., Colombia University, 1998), 24. 
31 GARF, f. 413, op. 2, d. 327, ll. 4-6. A discussion of sanitary enlightenment posters see F. Bernstein, ‘Visions 
of Sexual Health and Illness in Revolutionary Russia’ in Sin, Sex and Suffering, op.cit. 
32 J. A. Scott, ‘Venereal Diseases in the Soviet Union’, British Journal of Venereal Diseases, 21, 1 (March 1945), 
2-7, here 4. 
33 ibid., 4. 
34 Newsholme (1857-1943) was the Principal Medical Officer of the Local Government Board of England 
and Wales, as well as a lecturer on Public Health at John Hopkins University. Kingsburg (1876-1956) was 
the Secretary of the Milbank Memorial Fund, Commissioner of Public Charities for the City of New York. 
They travelled around major cities in the USSR during August and September 1932 and reported on medical 
and public health administration in Soviet Russia in this publication. 
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to the disappearance of unemployment, liquidation of prostitution and workers’ 
recognition for the ‘need for self-control’.35 His assertions suggest that both structural 
factors and acts of individual agency contributed to the spread of diseases, something 
which the Soviet government had apparently solved through universal employment and 
the instilling of new sexual values through health propaganda. Despite this praise, 
Newsholme and Kingsbury recognised the limitations of statistical information on 
venereal diseases, and prefaced their discussion with a comment that figures for these 
illnesses are always ‘notably untrustworthy’.36  
Statistics compiled by Soviet doctors continued to report remarkable success, and 
this was often the only data available to foreign researchers. This is evident in a 1943 
report from the Anglo-Soviet Medical Council, which purported that by 1935, levels of 
primary syphilis had declined to 1.8 cases in 10,000 in urban centres, and only 0.62 per 
10,000 in the countryside.37 These figures also feature in other English-language articles 
on Soviet campaigns of social hygiene, although only three references appear in the 
Anglo-Soviet Medical Council’s bibliography, one of which was a 1942 publication by the 
former People’s Commissar of Health, Nikolai Semashko.38 The Anglo-Soviet Council also 
reported that in Moscow the condition of primary syphilis was now so rare, that medical 
schools allegedly struggled to find cases for demonstration purposes. It is important to 
note that the criminalisation of the transmission of venereal diseases, in article 150 of the 
1926 Criminal Code, would have acted as a considerable disincentive for those suffering 
from venereal diseases to seek treatment. Fewer reported cases may have not reflected 
reality, but rather unwillingness on the part of individuals to reveal their infection, 
motivated by fear of prosecution.  
Soviet medical discourse grossly exaggerated triumphs in the field of venerology, 
especially at a regional level. The majority of state investment in the struggle with 
venereal diseases was concentrated in Moscow and Leningrad, which left much of the 
population in the provinces without practical help and support. The Soviet state’s grand 
                                                          
35 A. Newsholme and J. A. Kingsbury, Red Medicine: Socialised Health in Soviet Russia (New York, 1933), 261-
62. 
36 ibid., 260. 
37 Anglo-Soviet Medical Council, ‘Anti-Venereal Measures in the Soviet Union’, British Journal of Venereal 
Diseases 19, 1 (March 1943), 39-42, here 41. 
38 ‘Soviet Medicine and Hygiene: Impressions of Medical Tourists in Russia’, British Medical Journal, 2, 3700 
(December 1931), 1043-1044, also Scott, op.cit.  
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plans for widespread sanitary enlightenment and easily accessible treatment were little 
more than a mirage. For example, in 1925 out of the entire population, only 300,000 
people attended eighty-four dispensaries across the whole of the Soviet Union.39 Anna 
Haines, an American relief worker and frequent visitor to the Soviet Union, estimated that 
in 1928 the total number of beds in the USSR for those requiring hospitalisation because 
of venereal diseases was 3540 for a population of 140,000,000; or one bed for every 
40,000 people.40 Central government advocated greater work in the provinces, but it is 
difficult to know exactly the extent to which this happened in practice. This article will 
now move on to examine how the struggle with venereal diseases worked at a regional 
level in the Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol. I have selected this case study to explore how 
the campaign worked when the Soviet authorities were faced with an apparent urgent 
case: the fleet with the highest levels of venereal diseases in the entire world.  
Changing relationships in the 1920s 
The 1920s witnessed a transformation of the relationship between society and the 
military and naval forces in the Soviet Union.  While consolidating power during this 
decade, the Soviet state continuously waged a propaganda war in favour of new socialist 
values. The state employed militarised language when publicising policies of various 
campaigns, such as industrialisation, literacy and atheism. The hero and enemy were 
central figures in early Soviet propaganda posters. Here, the enemy was loosely defined 
and multifaceted: saboteurs, the clergy, capitalists and monarchists. The military and 
naval forces assumed a significant role for this propaganda, as all of the 600 newspapers 
and 900 journals of the Soviet Union were required to contain a military column, and each 
of the 3500 cinemas and 10,000 travelling cinemas had to show military films.41 This is 
part of the phenomenon military historian Gunnar Åselius refers to as the ‘general 
militarisation (voennizatsiia) of society’: a state of constant preparation for conflict 
promoted through the use of militarised language and an elevation of the importance of 
the armed forces.42 Similarly, Mark von Hagen argues that ‘military or martial values’ 
                                                          
39 T. Starks, Body Soviet: Propaganda, Hygiene and the Revolutionary State (Madison, 2008), 51. 
40 Anna Haines was an American-born nurse who visited Russia 1917-19; 1920-21; and 1925-27 as a relief 
worker for the American Friends Service Committee. See A. Haines, Health Work in Soviet Russia (New York, 
1928), 120. 
41 G. Åselius, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Navy in the Baltic, 1921-1941 (Abingdon, 2005), 102. 
42 ibid., 102. 
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were deeply embedded in the political culture of Bolshevik party and state bureaucracy.43 
Even during peacetime, the state’s increasing organisation of marches, demonstrations 
and commemorations of the immediate revolutionary past throughout the 1920s 
contributed to the hypervisibility of the military in society.44 
The 1920s also represent a decade of transformation for the composition of the 
Red Navy. The 1921 unsuccessful uprising against the Bolsheviks in Kronshtadt 
emphasised the threat that the naval forces could pose to the stability of the Soviet state, 
and the need to strengthen control and influence in this sphere. The complete political 
reconstruction of the Red Navy began in 1924 with the purge of around 750 officers who 
had served during the pre-revolutionary period. Between 1923 and 1927, at least 10,000 
committed Komsomol (All-Leninist Youth League) members swelled the ranks as their 
replacements.45 From 1927 onwards, energetic young officers from Soviet Naval 
Academies were rapidly promoted to positions of power and influence.46 In propaganda 
posters and other print media, the Red Navy appeared as essential protectors of the 
Soviet state. This article will now move on to examine one particular contingent within 
these naval forces, the Black Sea fleet. 
The Black Sea fleet 
The Black Sea fleet was an important naval contingent in imperial Russia, particularly in 
fighting the Ottoman Turkish Fleet in several campaigns during the First World War, 
prior to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918. The turmoil of the revolutions and 
Civil War significantly weakened the fleet, as most of its vessels were damaged beyond 
repair, sunk or taken by forces of the White Army to Bizerte in Tunisia.47 In May 1920, 
the Bolshevik regime created the Naval Forces of the Black Sea and Sea of Azov, to be 
renamed the Black Sea fleet in January 1935. The fleet went on to become the second 
largest in Soviet Russia by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War in June 1941.48 
                                                          
43 M. von Hagen, Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship: The Red Army and the Soviet Socialist State, 1917-
1930 (Ithaca and London, 1990), 332. 
44 M. Neumann, The Communist Youth League and the Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1917-1932 
(Abingdon, 2011), 119. 
45 D. W. Mitchell, A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power (London, 1974), 360. 
46 E. Morris, The Russian Navy: Myth and Reality (London, 1977), 20. 
47 Mitchell, op.cit., 356. 
48 N. Polmar, The Naval Institute Guide to the Soviet Navy, 5th edn (Annapolis, 1991), 18. 
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Between 1926 and 1927, levels of venereal diseases in the Black Sea fleet were 
reportedly high. On 9 September 1927, Muklevich issued a strong order of condemnation. 
He described levels of disease in the Black Sea as ‘exceptional in terms of numbers’ and 
as an example of ‘moral decay, which has not been met with enough consistency or sharp 
condemnation’.49 As noted at the beginning of this article, Soviet naval doctors reported 
that cases of venereal diseases in the Black Sea fleet exceeded all other fleets of the Soviet 
Navy, as well as all other international fleets. In 1926, 15.5 per cent of sailors were 
infected in the Black Sea, as opposed to only 11.8 per cent on average in the United States 
Navy.50 Muklevich compared these figures with those of the Russian Imperial Navy, 
where 10.7 per cent of men were infected in 1913.51 The order included several vague 
suggestions about how to properly conduct the struggle against venereal diseases in this 
region, notably: through an increase in prophylactic measures; better political 
management of naval forces; and more comprehensive health education. Muklevich even 
devised a memorable slogan for the campaign: ‘Not one venerik (venereal patient) on the 
ships or units’.52 
In the absence of any clear direction on how to wage the struggle, venereal 
diseases in the Navy did not begin to decline in autumn 1927. To obtain a clearer picture 
of the severity of the situation, Muklevich drafted in Dr Staronadmskii, the Doctor for 
Important Assignments of the Naval Forces. Staronadmskii sent Muklevich a 
comprehensive report to contextualise the levels of venereal diseases in the Black Sea 
fleet. This report claimed that diseases in the fleet vastly exceeded the average for the 
entire Soviet Navy between 1924 and 1927, and for the Imperial Russian Navy between 
1910 and 1916. This level of venereal diseases had not been seen since 1913.53 
 
 
 
                                                          
49 Order of the Chief of the Naval Forces, 9 September 1927 RGAVMF, f. 1483, op. 1, d. 56, l. 1. 
50 ibid., l. 1. 
51 ibid., l. 1. 
52 The slogan in the original Russia reads as «Ни одного венерика на корабле и а часты», ibid., l. 1. 
53 In this report, the average for the Caspian Flotilla in 1913 was recorded at sixteen per cent, far higher 
than the average for the whole Imperial Navy that year at 10.7 per cent. The Caspian Flotilla’s average fell 
to 13.9 per cent in 1914. RGAVMF, f. 1483, op. 1, d. 56, ll. 9-10. 
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Graph One – Percentage of sailors infected with a venereal disease in the Imperial 
and Soviet Navy, 1913-27. 54 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
54 Report of Staronadmskii on levels of venereal disease in the Imperial Navy, Soviet Navy and other navies 
across the world, 1 December 1927. RGAVMF f. 1483, op. 1, d. 56, ll. 9-10. 
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As well as being the most venereally diseased fleet in the Soviet Navy, the Black 
Sea fleet also allegedly surpassed all other international fleets, with 15.5 per cent of all 
sailors infected.55 According to Staronadmskii, the German Navy’s highest number of 
recorded cases was 13.3 per cent in 1922, and for the Royal Navy in Great Britain, 9.3 per 
cent in 1923. Muklevich claimed that overtaking the United States Navy was particularly 
humiliating for the Black Sea fleet, as the American naval forces had always ‘stood out 
amongst capitalist fleets’ in terms of venereal disease.56 As cases of venereal diseases in 
the United States Navy fell from 12.9 per cent to 11.8 per cent between 1925 and 1926, 
they apparently rose dramatically in the Black Sea fleet from 11.4 to 15.5 per cent. 
Graph Two – Percentage of sailors infected with a venereal disease in the United 
States Navy and the Black Sea fleet. 57 
 
                                                          
55 RGAVMF, f. 1483, op. 1, d. 56, l. 10. Staronadmskii provides data for the US Navy 1919-1926; German 
Navy 1920-1924; Royal Navy 1923-24; French Navy 1920-21; and Italian Navy 1911-1920. 
56 ibid., l. 1. 
57 ibid., l. 10. 
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Both the source and accuracy of Staronadmskii’s figures are difficult to determine 
due to the fragmented nature of available statistics on venereal diseases during the 
interwar period. Taking the example of the Royal Navy of Great Britain, data that supports 
the figures from Staronadmskii’s report also appeared in British medical discourse. 
Annual reports entitled ‘The Health of the Navy’ from The British Medical Journal 1922-
1925 suggest that Staronadmskii’s figures on the Royal Navy for 1923 and 1924 were 
relatively accurate. In 1922, the journal reported that levels of disease in British 
servicemen depended on where they were stationed; varying from eight per cent at the 
home station, to 28.2 per cent at the Chinese station.58 For 1923, they listed the average 
at nine per cent, which dropped to 8.2 per cent in 1924.59 In 1925, they did not report an 
exact figure, but instead stated that there had been a decrease in venereal diseases.60 
These figures represented a horrible indicator of the failure of anti-disease 
campaigns in the Soviet Union, which directly contradicted the state’s representations of 
glowing success in the fields of venereal treatment and research. The situation in the 
Black Sea was particularly problematic for the Soviet state given the instability of its first 
decade, in which the country witnessed civil war, famine and hyperinflation. The 
authorities believed that venereal diseases were a further threat to national security, as 
they envisioned the nation being left vulnerable to attack due to a massive depletion of 
labour. These figures also demonstrated a challenge to the power of high naval command, 
who had failed to control their units’ behaviour. Soviet sailors, even more so than their 
pre-revolutionary counterparts, failed to exercise sexual restraint and continued to reject 
prophylactics, despite mass campaigns of sanitary enlightenment and the political 
reconstruction of the Red Navy. Correspondence between Muklevich and the high 
command of the Black Sea in the year that followed included various recommendations 
for combatting of this ‘unacceptable state of affairs’. This was to be a full-scale struggle 
with venereal diseases, which focused on three main points for reform: the sources of 
disease; those who became infected; and the urban space of Sevastopol.  
                                                          
58 There is a three-year delay on the publication of statistics in the journal. ‘The Health of the Navy’, British 
Medical Journal, 2, 3377 (19 September 1925), 523-524. 
59 ‘The Health of the Navy’, British Medical Journal, 2, 3417 (3 July 1926), 22; ‘The Health of the Navy’, British 
Medical Journal, 1, 3464 (28 May 1927), 968. 
60 ‘The Health of the Services’, British Medical Journal, 1, 3502 (18 February 1928), 267-268. 
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The source of venereal diseases 
High command’s perception of who was responsible for spreading venereal diseases in 
the Black Sea fleet and Sevastopol was explicitly gendered. The chain of events was 
allegedly always the same: unemployed or homeless women became prostitutes and then 
went on to infect naval personnel, a view that was reflected in civilian attitudes which 
also connected prostitution and venereal disease transmission. As prostitution was 
decriminalised following the October revolution, in most cases, city and naval authorities 
suggested measures that focused on preventing any more women from entering 
prostitution and reforming those that already had. Prostitutes were to blame for venereal 
diseases; however, the authorities’ approach encouraged wider society to prevent 
disease circulation by involving the entire public in supporting economically vulnerable 
women. Despite recommendations for support and reform, some administrative bodies 
vilified the prostitute for her involvement in the transmission of venereal diseases, 
branding her as malicious and advocating repression. This section will explore the 
varying methods suggested by the authorities in Sevastopol for preventing the spread of 
disease through the destruction of its source.   
The official newspaper of the Black Sea fleet, Krasnyi Chernomorets, reported on 
measures taken by the Sevastopol Soviet to eradicate prostitution in the city in 1927.61 
The Soviet recognised that the majority of women who entered prostitution were poor, 
unemployed and unqualified. The article reported that seventy-five per cent of 
prostitutes in Sevastopol had worked in domestic service previously, an extremely low-
paid and unskilled profession that had been the biggest employer of women during the 
pre-revolutionary period. These women needed both ‘material and moral support’, which 
the council believed was best provided through the opening of a labour dispensary (trud 
profilaktoriia) in Sevastopol. These institutions emerged in Moscow and other major 
cities from 1924 onwards, and offered women who were infected with venereal diseases 
(in most cases, prostitutes) paid employment, lodgings, free medical treatment and the 
opportunity to learn a trade.62 The goal of the labour dispensary was to encourage women 
                                                          
61 Unknown author, ‘Obrashchenie ko vsemu sostavu morskikh sil cherskogo moriia’, Krasnyi 
Chernomorets, No. 287, 1927. The name of the newspaper roughly translates as ‘Red (meaning 
revolutionary) Black Sea sailors’.  RGAVMF, f. 1483, op. 1, d. 56, l. 11. 
62 For more on the labour dispensary see F. Bernstein, ‘Prostitutes and Proletarians: The Soviet Labour 
Clinic as Revolutionary Laboratory’ in W. Husband (ed). The Human Tradition in Modern Russia 
(Wilmington, 2000). 
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to stop working as prostitutes by training them in alternative skilled labour. The Soviet 
government believed that this method would eventually end both female unemployment 
and prostitution.  
The Sevastopol Soviet was keen to organise a labour dispensary due to the success 
stories reported from Moscow, where apparently ‘hundreds of prostitutes returned to 
labour’ following their stays at the institution.63 However, it is important to treat written 
testimony from those who entered the labour dispensary with caution, as very few 
accounts which attest to failure exist. The dominant narrative in both testimony and 
popular culture follows the same formula: desperate women who enter the dispensary 
who are then transformed into productive and conscious workers.64 Despite the apparent 
overwhelming success of the labour dispensary, the Soviet government did not allocate 
funds to ensure that at least one could be opened in each major urban settlement with 
high levels of prostitution. In 1925, seventy-five per cent of all labour dispensaries across 
the USSR were financially dependent on the central Commissariat, who often could not 
deliver the necessary funds.65 Even in the second largest city of Leningrad, a dispensary 
did not open until 1928 due to a lack of funding, even though the Leningrad Council for 
the Struggle with Prostitution marked it as the as the ‘main course’ of action for 
eradicating commercial sex.66  
The Sevastopol Soviet refused to allow limited funds to impede their course of 
action, and implored city residents to donate their time and money to the opening of a 
labour dispensary through voluntary work. They also reported that employees of the 
political department of the Black Sea fleet had donated half of their salaries to fund the 
struggle with prostitution. Further financial assistance was required, so they asked 
employees from other departments, such as safety and navigation, as well as the political 
department of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Crimean ASSR) to 
                                                          
63 ‘Obrashchenie ko vsemu’. 
64 Bernstein, ‘Prostitutes and Proletarians’, op.cit., 124-27. The 1926 film A Prostitute, Killed by Life 
(Prostitutka, Ubitaia Zhizhniu) directed by Oleg Frelikh also follows the pattern, where a young girl, Liuba, 
is seduced into prostitution, exploited, and then admitted to a labour dispensary where she becomes a vocal 
advocate for the institution.  
65 Haines, op.cit., 119. 
66 Report of the Leningrad Council for the Struggle with Prostitution, 1928. Tsentralnyi Gosudarstvennyi 
Arkhiv Sankt-Peterburga (TsGASPb subsequently), f. R4370, op. 1, d. 409, O rabote soveshchaniia po bor’be 
s prostitutsiei, l. 193. 
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follow suit.67 The Soviet conceptualised the struggle with prostitution and venereal 
diseases as a campaign that required the active involvement of all sectors of society. It 
was the financial responsibility of the whole public to contribute to ending prostitution. 
The focus on preventing women from entering prostitution to stop the spread of diseases 
reinforced the Soviet message that these diseases were matters of social hygiene, and 
their most effective treatment was within their social context.  
The naval authorities were less sympathetic to the plight of economically 
vulnerable women. They categorised some prostitutes as class enemies, who were 
undeserving of any financial assistance. In January 1928, Tikhomirov, the Head of the 
Political Inspectorate for the Red Army and Navy, produced a report that detailed vital 
steps for reducing levels of disease in the Black Sea, in which he listed the different types 
of prostitute that he claimed spread infection in Sevastopol. First, he described single, 
unemployed and homeless women, who he believed should have access to the labour 
dispensary. Secondly, employing the terminology used by sailors, he spoke of so-called 
‘mama’s daughters’ (mamen’kiny dochki) who he defined as the ‘petty-bourgeois masses’ 
living in the suburbs of Sevastopol who ‘engage in both free and paid casual sex’.68 He 
believed that these women were not prostitutes because of economic need, and instead 
spread disease maliciously through their promiscuous behaviour, something that Soviet 
state discourse condemned in health education campaigns in the early 1920s. 
In February 1928, an article in Krasnyi Chernomorets also divided prostitutes into 
two camps. The author described the first category as ‘stray wolves [who] have slipped 
onto the muddy path of prostitution because of need’.69 The second category of prostitute 
was a ‘black spot’ and the active assistance of the public was required to ‘root out [this] 
debauchery’ and ‘wash away the stain’. The language used implied that the second 
category of prostitute was irredeemable, and instead must be repressed and removed 
from Sevastopol.70 This is echoed in a list of resolutions presented by the Sevastopol 
district committee for continuing the struggle with venereal diseases in the region. As 
                                                          
67 ‘Obrashchenie ko vsemu’ 
68 Report by Tikhomirov and Muklevich, January 1928. RGAVMF, f. 1483, op. 1, d. 56, l. 19. 
69 Unknown author, ‘Nado smyt’ chernoe piatno’, Krasnyi Chernomorets, No. 33, 3 March 1928. RGAVMF, f. 
1483, op. 1, d. 56, l. 32. 
70 Military perceptions mirrored civilian attitudes. Elizabeth Waters discusses the way in which policy and 
the wider public classified prostitutes as either victims and villains in the early Soviet Union. See E. Waters, 
‘Victim or Villain: Prostitution in Post-Revolutionary Russia’ in L. Edmondson (ed). Women and Society in 
Russia and the Soviet Union (Cambridge, 1992). 
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well as recommendations for the improvement of women’s employment, they included 
directions for dealing with so-called ‘malicious prostitutes’ and ‘women who returned to 
prostitution’.71 The authorities would forcefully evict these women from Sevastopol and 
liquidate the brothels in which they worked. The committee wanted these repressive 
measures to be visible to the public as a deterrent, so they advocated the periodic staging 
of show trials of those believed to be ‘maliciously diseased’ (zlostnye veneriki), and their 
wide coverage in the press.72 
The distinctions made between these two types of prostitute reveal the different 
ways in which the naval and civil authorities constructed venereal diseases. They argued 
that female unemployment and homelessness contributed to some women’s entry into 
prostitution. These women apparently spread diseases in the absence of choice, through 
desperation and financial vulnerability. They also constructed another category of 
women who preferred to work in the financially lucrative business of prostitution despite 
the risk of disease, and chose to reject the labour dispensary. In this instance, disease was 
allegedly a tool used by these women to subvert the Soviet state and actively resist 
attempts to reform them into productive Soviet citizens. This classification also provided 
the authorities with an identifiable enemy who threatened national security even during 
a period of peacetime, which gave the campaign a renewed level of urgency. The struggle 
with venereal diseases could then be waged energetically against the women who refused 
to participate in the industrial construction of the Soviet state, and who deliberately 
infected its lines of defence. 
The categories of ‘maliciously diseased’ and those who engaged in ‘both free and 
paid casual sex’ implies that the authorities recognised that commercial sex might not 
have been the only problem, despite the emphasis on prostitution in discourse. The 
authorities highlighted sexual promiscuity (polovyi raspushchennost’) as another source 
of infection and an obstacle in the struggle with venereal diseases. In a list of directives 
produced for various sections of political apparatus, the Health Department explained 
that that the role of the newspaper Krasnyi Chernomorets was to help shape negative 
                                                          
71 Resolutions for the struggle with prostitution, 10 October 1928. RGAVMF, f. R397, op. 3, d. 458, Materialy 
o bor’be s venericheskimi zabolevaniiami, l. 3. 
72 ibid., l. 3. Tricia Starks discusses several 1920s show trials of those who infected others with venereal 
diseases in T. Starks, op.cit., 187-190. 
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public opinion on ‘sexual promiscuity, alcoholism and prostitution’.73 The newspaper 
accepted this responsibility, and opened an article with the following call to arms: 
 
All who stand for discipline and consciousness, who struggle 
against promiscuity and debauchery, must cause uproar 
against the outpour of debauchery from the sea: syphilis, 
gonorrhoea and chancroid.74 
 
In a similar way to the classification of prostitutes into ‘needy’ and ‘malicious’ by 
military and civil authorities, the author created two opposing sides: actively conscious 
citizens of the Soviet state, and the licentious individuals who attempted to corrupt it with 
their diseases. Venereal diseases were clearly identified as the enemy, which stressed the 
urgent necessity of the wider public’s participation during a period of peacetime. All 
decent people must participate. The creation of this tension in the casting of promiscuity 
as an insidious enemy allowed the Soviet authorities to legitimise the regulation of 
individual’s sexual behaviour more generally. This is even more evident in the treatment 
of those who became infected.  
The infected 
In the vast majority of cases, the naval authorities in the Black Sea believed that 
prostitutes infected sailors. Despite this, sailors were not defined as passive recipients of 
diseases, and they had an active role to play in the struggle. High command intervened in 
the intimate lives of their sailors, and their sexual behaviour in particular was under 
constant scrutiny. In a list of measures for the struggle in the Black Sea sent to Muklevich 
by the Head of the Political Inspectorate Tikhomirov, an entire section was devoted to the 
organisation of the sex lives of sailors; something which naval high command believed 
was their business to regulate. One of the recommendations was the promotion of a 
period of ‘temporary abstinence’ for all sailors during periods of voyage.75 Tikhomirov 
                                                          
73 Resolutions for the struggle with venereal disease, RGAVMF, f. R397, op. 3, d. 458, ll. 6-7. 
74 ‘Nado smyt’ chernoe piatno’. 
75 RGAVMF, f. 1483, op. 1, d. 56, l. 25. 
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believed that this was achievable through both visual propaganda and the organisation 
of boxing and wrestling competitions between sailors from different ships and 
compounds. These competitions had multiple benefits. They would provide 
entertainment; the physical exertion from participating would ‘reduce sexual tension’; 
and the nature of these fighting sports would aid ‘development in the quality of combat’ 
of sailors in the Red Navy.76 Sailors were to use the relative quiet of peacetime to 
simultaneously resist their sexual urges and improve their skills of combat.  
The struggle with venereal diseases gave high command justification for 
interfering in the intimate lives and bodies of their personnel. They advocated abstinence 
as the most effective method for avoiding infection, but naval officers understood that 
implementing this was difficult in practice. To get around this, the Revolutionary Military 
Soviet of the Black Sea fleet made it mandatory that following sexual intercourse, sailors 
had to report to their nearest medical point for prophylactic care.77 Those who did not 
attend were to be ‘brought to justice for deliberately violating their working capacity’ and 
endangering the interests of the fleet. Even in peacetime, passivity became subversive 
behaviour, and privacy in matters of prophylactics was prohibited.  
The term ‘personal prophylactics’ (lichnyi profilaktiki) does not correspond to our 
contemporary understanding of contraception, as in, a method applied before sexual 
intercourse to protect against disease. In the pre-revolutionary and early Soviet periods, 
medical professionals mainly recommended that prophylactics were to be used after 
sexual intercourse. From the late nineteenth century, Russian physicians advised that this 
kind of preventative treatment should be used widely in the naval forces. In the pre-
revolutionary Navy, so-called individual ‘prophylactic packages’ were available for 
sailors to purchase from the end of 1909. These packages were intended for individual 
use and they contained various disinfectants to be applied following sexual intercourse, 
including a tube of silver proteinate to prevent gonorrhoea and an anti-syphilis formalin 
cream.78 Pre-revolutionary naval authorities also recommended the use of condoms to 
                                                          
76 ibid., l. 25. 
77 ibid., l. 23. 
78 ‘K Lichnoi Profilaktike Venericheskikh Boleznei’, Russkii Zhurnal Kozhnikh i Venericheskikh Boleznei, 
6 (June 1913), 428. 
Siobhan Hearne 
 
22 
 
protect against venereal diseases, but some physicians argued that they were an 
unreliable preventative measure.79  
Antiseptic packages and condoms were not readily available for Black Sea sailors 
in the 1920s. Dr Staronadmskii, the Doctor for Important Assignments of the Naval 
Forces, reported in late 1927 that the Military Medical Department had only just ‘taken 
steps to manufacture individual prophylactic packages’ for sailors.80 The quality of 
condoms was still poor in the 1920s, and many Soviet doctors considered them to be 
potentially harmful for both men and women.81 The fact the Military Soviet instructed 
Black Sea sailors to report to their nearest medical point to receive prophylactic 
treatment, rather than administering it themselves, is further evidence of the lack of 
available portable prophylactic means. Additionally, by administering prophylactic 
treatment at a clinic, rather than focusing on the mass manufacture of individual 
packages, naval command were able to ensure that sailors were actually using 
preventative measures and absorbing information from health education and 
propaganda. This method also allowed the naval authorities to monitor exactly who was 
having sex within their units, and the frequency with which this was happening. The 
Military Soviet’s ‘hands-on’ approach to administering prophylactic treatment prohibited 
privacy and justified greater state interference into the lives of sailors.  
The degree of interference into the private lives of Soviet sailors was not unique, 
and similar practices existed in the French Navy in the late nineteenth century.82 During 
wartime, servicemen in Britain and the United States were also subject to similar 
procedures. In the USA during the First World War, the War Department ordered that any 
soldiers who contracted venereal diseases after failing to use prophylactics would face 
trial and imprisonment, as well as losing their wages for their period of hospitalisation.83 
In the British Army, any soldier admitted to hospital with a venereal disease faced losing 
                                                          
79 In 1914, the Collegiate Assessor at the Port of Emperor Alexander III in Libava recommended 
condoms to prevent the spread of venereal diseases, along with compulsory corporeal examination and 
the large-scale manufacture of antiseptic ‘prophylactic kits’. RGAVMF, f. 949, op. 3, d. 4, Upravleniia 
sanitarnogo chast’iu morskoi kreposti, l. 2. Criticism of the effectiveness of condoms can be found in ‘K 
Lichnoi Profilaktike Venericheskikh Boleznei’, op.cit., 428. 
80 RGAVMF, f. 1483, op. 1, d. 56, l. 9. 
81 Bernstein, ‘Behind the Closed Door’, op.cit., 102. 
82 Surkis, op.cit., 220. 
83 E. H, Beardsley, ‘Allied Against Sin: American and British Responses to Venereal Disease in World War I’, 
Medical History 20, 2 (1976), 189-202, here 196. 
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their pay while undergoing treatment and being forbidden from taking leave for twelve 
months afterwards.84 British military personnel were also subject to ‘humiliating random 
inspections’ in which they were obliged to show their genitalia to their officers on 
demand.85 Despite these similarities, the situation in the Soviet Union differed due to 
peacetime military conscription. Compulsory military service was abolished in the USA 
and Great Britain in 1918 and 1920 respectively. In the USSR, the first peacetime draft 
began in 1924, and the Soviet state promised conscripts various benefits including special 
access to health care, living quarters and preferential treatment for their children in 
schools.86 By the autumn of 1925, military high command reported than ninety per cent 
of all eligible conscripted males appeared for induction.87 The drafting of men into the 
forces during peacetime meant that the military authorities continued to interfere in the 
lives of a large portion of the male population outside the context of wartime.  
The Soviet Union also differed in the availability of individual antiseptic 
prophylactic kits. During the interwar years, prophylactic packages were publicly 
available in some countries outside the USSR. In Britain from 1923, pharmacists were 
permitted to sell antiseptic prophylactic packages, although there were some restrictions 
on their advertisement.88 The VD Act in Germany removed any remaining restrictions on 
the sale of antiseptic packages and condoms in 1927, and following this, they were readily 
available in railway stations, bars and cafes in most German cities.89 In the USSR, 
individual prophylactic packages were not legalised until 1923, and even after this, 
rubber shortages halted the manufacture of condoms throughout the 1920s and 1930s.90 
There is little evidence to suggest that the Soviet government took decisive steps to 
manufacture personal prophylactics to protect against diseases for mass consumption, 
and instead the military authorities relied on clinic-based post-coitus methods 
throughout the 1920s.91 
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High naval command also sought to transform the ways in which sailors thought 
about venereal diseases. In early 1928, Muklevich received a report which criticised the 
Health Department for convincing soldiers that all venereal diseases were curable with 
the correct treatment.92 This message was allegedly damaging, and encouraged sailors to 
adopt a ‘flippant attitude’ towards prophylactics, comforted that a ‘relaxing stay at the 
hospital is not so bad’. In the same year, the Head of the Military Medical Department 
called for the expansion of propaganda and educational work for naval personnel and the 
civilian population.93 The focus of this campaign was the negative effects of prostitution, 
alcoholism and venereal diseases, and in particular, how these phenomena endangered 
public health. The authorities worked hard to create a sense of urgency for the struggle 
with diseases, and further cemented their perception as the enemy undermining the 
security of the Soviet state.  
In addition to corporeal control, the naval authorities attempted to regulate 
sailors’ leisure time, which was longer in the context of peacetime. Sailors’ enjoyment of 
free time was dependent on their conforming to Soviet standards of appropriate 
behaviour. It was the duty of officers in the Black Sea fleet to ‘assess the state’ of sailors 
returning from the shore, and disqualify those who had engaged in sexual debauchery, 
drunkenness or so-called ‘disgraceful behaviour’ (bezobraznoe povedeniie) from future 
leave.94 Tikhomirov instructed the Revolutionary Military Soviet of the Black Sea fleet to 
wait until ten or eleven in the evening before sending sailors on shore leave, after the 
theatres and cinemas had closed in Sevastopol.95 The Political Department for the Black 
Sea fleet was to work with the State Theatre and Art Association of Sevastopol to assess 
the repertoire of entertainment across the city, and ensure that any plays or films with 
‘unhealthy sexual inclinations’ were banned. Using the campaign to struggle with 
venereal diseases, high command limited the sailors’ access to, and content of, 
entertainment, hence intervening into their leisure time.96 
The struggle mainly focused on the conduct of ordinary sailors, although the 
sexual behaviour of officers was also monitored through recommendations. Measures to 
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combat venereal diseases stressed that the line of command should ‘increase their 
responsibility’ over their men and set a ‘personal example’ to their units by exercising 
sexual restraint.97 The district committee of Sevastopol made it clear that high rankings 
officers were not immune from punishment. The local Commission for the Struggle with 
Venereal Diseases and Prostitution advocated ‘strict disciplinary sanctions’ for all 
military personnel found in brothels, regardless of their position.98 In this instance, the 
city authorities constructed disease as a threat which transcended all ranks, which 
validated their surveillance over the entire hierarchy of the navy. 
The urban space of Sevastopol 
Sevastopol was described in Krasnyi Chernomorets as a ‘magnet for prostitutes’, because 
of its port status and reputation as a commercial hub.99 The city was attractive for a 
variety of reasons: it was the largest population centre of the Crimean ASSR; the 
headquarters of the Black Sea fleet; and one of the few developed tourist resorts in the 
entire Soviet Union.100 These factors suggest that prostitutes in Sevastopol had access to 
a substantial client base. Figures on the infection rates of sailors collected by the naval 
authorities reported that in the vast majority of cases, prostitutes allegedly infected 
sailors inside the city. An emergency message sent from Mironov, the Head of the Black 
Sea fleet, to the Commander of the Naval Forces of the Black Sea presented infection rates 
for May and June 1928. Out of fifty-three cases from different units of the naval forces, 
naval personnel named prostitutes as the source of infection in fifty-one instances.101  
Sailors who had contracted a venereal disease named Sevastopol’s prostitutes as 
the source of their infection in almost ninety-five per cent of all cases between the 1 May 
and 22 June 1928.102 Men who worked on ships made up the majority of those infected in 
this period, and ninety-one per cent of this group claimed that they had contracted their 
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disease through commercial sex in Sevastopol. It is questionable whether they would 
have been able to identify the exact source of their infection with such accuracy, 
especially when the diagnosis of venereal diseases such as syphilis was based on 
unreliable methodology. The Wassermann (1909) and Kahn (1923) tests for syphilis 
revolutionised venereal disease screening by introducing blood testing for greater 
accuracy. However, even when combining the two methods, contemporaries frequently 
described results as inaccurate, and physicians would have struggled to perform these 
two highly specialised tests effectively.103 Gonorrhoea was even more evasive, and 
physicians often relied on their own empirical clinical knowledge to diagnose diseases.104 
If even the diagnosis of the disease itself was frequently inaccurate, it is reasonable to 
assume that the source of infection was equally uncertain. Instead, figures reveal who 
both sailors and the high command of the Black Sea Fleet perceived to be the most 
frequent transmitters of venereal diseases. These perceptions reflected their 
preconceptions about disease, urban space and sexual behaviour, which marked the 
prostitute and the city as exceptionally infectious.  Their responses also suggest that the 
interrelation of prostitution and venereal diseases in anti-disease campaigns may have 
provided sailors with a convenient scapegoat. By naming the anonymous prostitute as 
the source of infection, they could have avoided implicating a male or female partner.  
City authorities perceived that the reclassification and reordering of the urban 
space of Sevastopol was essential to suppress the business of prostitution. In a 1928 
report sent to Muklevich, the urban landscape of Sevastopol was used to explain the high 
levels of prostitution in the region. The report highlighted the central site of prostitution 
in the city as the seaside boulevard (primorskii bul’var), which was also an infamous site 
for male prostitutes soliciting clients for same-sex relations in this period.105 This 
thoroughfare was allegedly ‘flooded with prostitutes at night’ who took advantage of the 
lack of street lights and police in the area, enjoying relative privacy. The activities within 
this space, the lack of surveillance and light, helped to create an informal red-light district 
in Sevastopol which achieved a level of notoriety. This was also true of Victorian London, 
where technological advances, such as the introduction of electric lighting on major 
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thoroughfares, forced prostitutes to renegotiate their working environments and 
relocate to quieter side streets.106 The authorities evidently believed that improving the 
illumination of the boulevard would destroy its reputation as a hub for prostitution. They 
also recommended strengthening the ‘administrative supervision’ of all city boulevards, 
and increasing police presence.107 The space was malleable, and those directing the 
struggle with venereal diseases believed that it could be shaped, organised and made 
respectable once again.  
In both Sevastopol and the wider Soviet Union, the complete removal of the 
brothel from the urban landscape was a key part in the struggle with venereal diseases. 
The Criminal Code of 1922 made brothel keeping and pimping illegal, with a minimum 
sentence of three years’ imprisonment.108 From this year onwards, the Soviet authorities 
monitored entertainment establishments and ‘suspicious’ apartments in an attempt to 
prevent informal brothels from emerging.109 The destruction of a well-established site of 
commercial sex increased prostitutes’ visibility in society, as it forced them out into 
public space. Despite their illegality, brothels continued to exist, and in some cases 
flourish, in early Soviet Russia.110 
In December 1927, Muklevich described brothels as ‘hotbeds of infection’ (ochag 
zarazy) and emphasised their prominent role in the spread of diseases.111 Muklevich’s 
perception of the brothel as a site of contagion and his rhetoric of infection can be 
explained through Mary Douglas’ concept of dirt. For Muklevich, dirt threatened order 
and the necessity of its removal provided rationale for the reorganising and ‘cleansing’ of 
urban space.112 In the case of Sevastopol, the links made between disease and the brothel 
aided both the transformation of the city and the promotion of more ‘normal’ forms of 
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sexuality. If infection primarily occurred inside the brothel, then individuals were advised 
to avoid sex with prostitutes and instead pursue more traditional sexual long-term 
relationships.113 
Despite these measures, brothels continued to exist in Sevastopol. In October 
1928, the district committee stressed the necessity of the ‘liquidation of dens of 
prostitution’ (pritony prostitutsii).114 They referred to a particular type of ‘concealed’ 
brothel in the city, where several women lived together and worked as prostitutes in an 
informal setting. These establishments could represent the ways in which prostitutes 
adapted to new legislation regarding their occupation. Elizabeth Waters argues that the 
1920s saw huge transformations in the business of prostitution, and a lessening of the 
distance between prostitutes and the wider urban community. Informal brothels sprang 
up in apartments across urban centres, where prostitutes rented as a group and shared 
responsibilities, without the need for a pimp or madame.115 It was the invisibility of these 
establishments that troubled the authorities in Sevastopol, as apartment brothels 
blended in with the rest of the urban landscape. The existence of this type of brothel 
subverted the gaze of the city authorities, as they were unable to construct the urban 
space of Sevastopol in such a way that made it possible for them to ‘see constantly and 
recognise immediately’.116 The fact that these establishments had customers also 
suggests that residents of Sevastopol had a greater level of knowledge about their city 
than those who managed and policed it.  The district committee’s solution was to conduct 
periodic raids and patrols throughout Sevastopol in an attempt to root out these sites of 
prostitution.117 By forcefully entering the space of the brothel and prosecuting those who 
ignored the Criminal Code, the authorities attempted to reclaim the urban space of the 
city. 
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Conclusion 
This article has used the case study of Sevastopol and the Black Sea fleet to demonstrate 
how those in authority conceptualised the struggle with venereal diseases in the 1920s. 
During this decade, the Soviet Union was still in the early stages of its history and had 
emerged economically and materially crippled following the destruction of the 
revolutions and Civil War. Therefore, those in power were particularly anxious about 
venereal diseases removing healthy people from the industrial workforce, which was 
necessary for societal reconstruction. The same could be said for the construction of 
diseases in the Red Navy. Diseases were identified as the enemy, and the struggle against 
them a battlefield in which control, surveillance and sanitary enlightenment were the 
most effective weapons. A new country required competent forces for defence, something 
which venereal diseases jeopardised.   
The Black Sea fleet’s status as the most diseased contingent of the Red Navy 
legitimised state involvement in all aspects of the lives of servicemen. The intimate and 
private lives of sailors were to be standardised, transformed and ‘made healthy’ by the 
state. As protectors of Soviet security, sailors’ bodies became property of the state, and 
even when promoting the use of preventative measures, the naval authorities in 
Sevastopol insisted on their physical involvement in the process. The likening of disease 
to an enemy, and the struggle as a battle, was used to engage servicemen with urgency 
outside of a period of international conflict.   
In the struggle with venereal diseases in Sevastopol, the authorities consistently 
named prostitutes and promiscuous women as the source of all infection, which allowed 
them to promote long-term sexual relationships rather than casual encounters. By 
dividing prostitutes into the two camps of victim and villain, high command constructed 
an identifiable enemy to engage the Navy and wider public to actively fight against in the 
context of peacetime. In the same way, the brothel was marked as a site of contagion and 
disease, and its clandestine status allowed city authorities to justify the greater 
surveillance and policing of the urban community.  The remoulding and reshaping of city 
space was also an integral part of the struggle with diseases. High command’s 
classification of certain areas of Sevastopol, along with certain women in the city, as 
polluted and contagious authorised their increased interference. Therefore, these 
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constructions of venereal disease helped to legitimise the city and naval authorities’ 
interventions into the private, and intimate, lives of military personnel and the wider 
population.  
 
 
 
 
